Secure your AI agents and MCP servers

MCP decides which tool runs. ENI6MA decides whether the world is allowed to change, with a one-shot envelope on every side-effecting call.

Agent stacks standardize tool schemas; they do not mint identity. If poll_headlines or write_ticket is implemented as “send a long-lived secret,” every improvement to the agent increases the cost of a single leak , from logs, prompt injection, or a compromised host.

ENI6MA Gate’s MCP wrapper puts proof in front of tools that mutate state. Agents and MCP faces expose tools; they are not configured with a bypass credential for the protected resource. Multi-agent estates can issue per-agent circuits so one compromised specialist does not inherit org-wide ambient authority.

What you would deploy

Gate MCP wrapper on side-effecting tools (Demo today; evaluation path via DEMO-HACK).
Hybrid circuits in agent mode for M2M tool callers.
Control ledger with burn-before-validate so captured tool envelopes are fossils.
Optional Verify suite to falsify replay and retarget before production cutover.

What this solution claims

AI agents and MCP servers can authorize side effects per call without holding ambient API credentials.ValidatedGate MCP wrapper + one-shot envelopes on tool invocations that change state.

MCP decides which tool runs; ENI6MA decides whether the world is allowed to change.ValidatedTool discovery stays in MCP; side-effecting calls still require a valid one-shot envelope at the gate.

Protected routes do not rely on a reusable API key, bearer token, or service certificate as the authority object.ValidatedThe gate accepts a per-call envelope; agents and MCP faces are not configured with a bypass secret.Holds under the reference architecture