Kill the key. Long live the proof.
Passwords, tokens, and certificates keep working until someone rotates or revokes them - including an attacker who already has a copy. ENI6MA replaces that lasting authority with one-shot proofs: each approval authorizes one action once, across apps, agents, and paper. Captured proofs do not replay; authority ends with the request. Deploy as Public, Cloud, or Sovereign stacks under the reference architecture and model-scoped claims.
One-shot proofs across digital systems and paper. Authority expires with the request - under the reference architecture and claim model.
Stored secret vs one-shot proof
Read left-to-right: the stored-secret column shows ambient credentials that keep working after copy; the one-shot column shows a request-bound envelope that burns after accept. Takeaway: stolen possession is not lasting authority when the proof dies with the moment.
Applied Scenarios
Browse all scenarios
Illustrative scenarios. The organizations named and the logos shown are publicly documented reference organizations, not ENI6MA customers. No commercial relationship, deployment, or endorsement is claimed or implied.
Enterprise installs it. People feel it.
Fewer support fires. Fewer lasting break-ins.
Forgot password is a cost center
Fewer tickets. Less lasting access after a steal. Less time restoring systems.
Cut reset & recovery tickets →Stop the attack before recovery starts
Prevention — not a weekend of resets.
Prevent stolen logins from lasting →Companies install it to save time and money. People get safer logins where they already are.
What you stop relying on - and what you keep
Retire the reusable-credential breach surface. Keep the IdP, mTLS, and application systems you already run; Gate layers one-shot request authority on top.
Eliminate
- Reusable passwords as lasting authority
- Standing API keys and bearer tokens
- OTP MFA as lasting authorization factor
- Biometric templates as lasting secrets
Deny (scoped)
- Replay (claim: replay-impossible)
- Phishing-for-capability (claim: immune-phishing)
- Vault-breach-as-takeover (claim: immune-vault-breach)
- Keylogging of a reusable secret (claim: immune-keylogging)
- Learning the secret from the public channel under the named model
Works across
- AI agents and MCP tool calls
- APIs and workloads behind Gate
- Mobile and desktop web
- Air-gapped Foundry and Control deployments
- Physical Paper Identity Proof sheets
Ambient credentials are the breach
Every API key, bearer token, and service certificate in your estate works from anywhere until you notice it is gone. ENI6MA closes that open: a stolen key is not lasting capability, and revocation is one registry state change under the reference architecture - the verifier observes allow or deny for that request alone.
Ambient credentials invite breach
Ambient API keys, bearer tokens, and certificates as stealable tokens leading to breach
Possession is not authority
Token-copy chain showing possession mistaken for authority at agent scale
Capture is not knowledge
Follow the observer path: a full transcript fills the notebook while the vault for the secret stays closed. Surface bits are recordable; effective mutual information with the secret stays empty under the model. Takeaway: capture of the channel is not knowledge of the secret.
Every API key, bearer token, and service certificate is a secret that works from anywhere until you notice it is gone.Ambient credentials authorize by possession alone; ENI6MA replaces that model with one-shot, request-bound proofs.
An API key, bearer token, or service certificate works from any path that can present it. ENI6MA binds authority to one request so a captured secret cannot authorize a second call under the reference architecture.
Ambient revocation is a fleet rotation campaign. With circuit handles in Control, deactivation is one registry state change every consulting Gate observes on the next proof.
MCP tools and autonomous agents mint long-lived secrets faster than humans. Per-call envelopes wrap each tool invocation so Gate/policy authorizes world-changing side effects once - not lasting request authority under the reference architecture.
Product capabilities
Cloud. Agent. Human.
One family of one-shot proofs: stolen secrets stop granting lasting capability, agents authorize each tool call once, and people prove without a reusable password or biometric template as lasting authority.
One proof family
Three surfaces (cloud, agent, and human) share one envelope primitive rather than three incompatible credential schemes. Read the shared core first, then the surface-specific ceremony wrappers. Takeaway: Channel Zero is one proof job expressed across form factors.
Cloud
Protect the estate without rewriting it
Put Gate in front of the routes that matter. PKI and mTLS stay for transport identity; ENI6MA replaces the reusable API keys and bearer tokens that authorize requests.
A stolen secret is not a stolen capability (authority is request-bound and one-shot).
Explore →Agent
Per-call authority for tools that change the world
MCP and agent runtimes decide which tool to call. ENI6MA decides whether that call may produce a side effect, without ambient API keys sitting in the agent host.
Per-call authority matches how agents actually operate (many short hops, not one long-lived token).
Explore →Human
Prove knowledge without broadcasting a secret
Pass+ turns human memory into a dynamic interactive proof. The Private Synonym Map decouples what appears on screen from what the user communicates, so observers, cameras, and keyloggers see ambiguous tokens, not a reusable password.
No reusable credential to phish or harvest from a fake portal.
Explore →Status quo vs ENI6MA outcomes
What lasting credentials force you to accept versus what one-shot authority changes: captured secrets stop granting lasting power, replay fails under the reference architecture, and revocation is one registry change. Each absolute cites its claim ID.
One-shot vs reusable credentials
Compare the reusable-credential lifetime on the left with the per-request one-shot proof on the right. Reuse invites steal-and-replay; one-shot authority dies after burn. Takeaway: the same word “proof” can mean lasting possession or momentary ceremony work.
No lasting power from a captured secret
Authority expires at the end of each request.The envelope binds method, endpoint_id, request hash, policy hash, tau, and nonce (one message, one use).Holds under the reference architecture
Replay fails under the reference architecture
Replay is impossible by design.The nonce is burned before validation in a durable ledger; it is spent even when validation later fails.Holds under the reference architecture
No reusable credential to harvest for lasting capability
Immune to phishing.No reusable credential exists to harvest; endpoint_id binding means a relayed proof fails on any other route.Holds under the reference architecture
Identity is not a vault of reusable secrets
Immune to credential-vault breach.No vault of reusable secrets exists; identity is compiled into the circuit binary, not stored as a transferable credential.Holds under the reference architecture
One registry state change deactivates the handle
Revocation is one state change.Deactivating a circuit handle in the registry revokes the identity; there is no rotation campaign across every workload.Holds under the reference architecture
Per-call authorization for tool side effects
Authority expires at the end of each request.The envelope binds method, endpoint_id, request hash, policy hash, tau, and nonce (one message, one use).Holds under the reference architecture
Paper Identity Proof without biometric templates as lasting authority
Foundry sovereign and air-gap capable minting for estates that cannot leave the network
Full mechanism detail on Security architecture. Guarantees assume the reference architecture. Compare security systems in depth on the Math comparison matrix.
Start where credentials fail first
Three buyer tracks: AI agents and MCP tools, high-risk APIs and endpoints, and PKI authorization coexistence. Agent and MCP security leads because ambient tokens and long-lived tool secrets proliferate fastest there; each track maps to Gate-enforced one-shot envelopes under the same claim model.
Buyer tracks
Three buyer rails: agents and MCP, APIs, and PKI coexistence
Secure your AI agents and MCP servers
Wrap tools so each invocation carries a one-shot envelope. Gate/policy authorizes world-changing tool calls; a captured agent secret does not grant lasting request authority under the reference architecture.
Explore →Secure your APIs and endpoints
Put Gate in front of high-risk routes. Method, body hash, endpoint, and policy bind into every proof so the verifier observes allow or deny for that binding alone; replay and relay fail under the claim model.
Explore →Replace or augment PKI authorization
Replaces the part of PKI that keeps breaching you (the credentials that authorize requests). Certificates stay for transport identity; ENI6MA owns request authority via one-shot envelopes on protected routes.
Explore →Applied scenarios
Illustrative architectures against publicly documented reference organizations - role-based access, financial API binding, regulated workload control - not customer engagements or endorsements.
Scenario reference architecture
Generic applied-scenario reference architecture template
Global technology
Role-based access without ambient MFA tokens
Reference organization: Microsoft
Illustrative ScenarioBanking
Request-bound authorization for financial APIs
Reference organization: JPMorgan Chase
Illustrative ScenarioAerospace and defense
Mandatory access control for regulated workloads
Reference organization: Boeing
Illustrative ScenarioIllustrative scenarios. The organizations named and the logos shown are publicly documented reference organizations, not ENI6MA customers. No commercial relationship, deployment, or endorsement is claimed or implied.
Live capture
Security guided tour
Twenty-nine screens from a live DEMO-HACK red-team run, burn-before-validate, envelope binding, and every reject stage, with hotspot callouts and payload excerpts.
Security guided tour
Guided tour stack: health, allow, attacks, mint
See allow, deny, and replay fail
Watch a live path accept a valid proof, reject a replay, and surface every Gate reject stage - then try Pass+ for a human one-shot proof without teaching the channel the secret.
Single-request proof path
Host to Client to Server to Burn to Validate single-request path
Security guided tour
See allow/deny and replay fail across the live DEMO-HACK host→client→server path with hotspot evidence and every reject stage.
Open →Gate walkthrough
Happy path plus reject stages on a live Gate: binding mismatch, spent nonce, stale timing, and policy deny - observable allow or deny.
Open →Verify walkthrough
Watch the attack suite show replay fail against a deployed Gate before production traffic does.
Open →Pass+ ceremony
Teaching UI: six zones, bearing-only responses, one verdict after six witnesses - one-shot proof without teaching the channel the secret.
Open →How a Gate decides
Eight fixed checks run before application logic: bind the request, spend the nonce, then allow or deny. A second submission of the same envelope fails under the reference architecture (claims: burn-before-validate, replay-impossible).
Recompute the request hash
The gate hashes the body it actually received and compares it to the envelope.
Rejects: A body that was altered after the proof was made.
Check endpoint and policy
The envelope names the endpoint and the policy it was made for; both must match this route.
Rejects: A valid proof relayed to a different endpoint.
Confirm the circuit is active
The handle is resolved against the registry and must be active. Deactivating a handle is how revocation happens.
Rejects: A proof from a revoked identity.
Check freshness
The envelope timestamp must fall inside the freshness window configured for the route.
Rejects: A captured envelope replayed after the window closed.
Burn the nonce
The nonce is spent here, before the proof is validated. Every submission spends it, including one that is about to fail validation.
Rejects: Any second use of the same envelope. This is where replay dies.
Validate the proof
Only now is the proof itself checked, against the local binary or the registry. Both modes are equivalent at the envelope layer.
Rejects: A forged or malformed proof.
Apply application policy
Ordinary authorization runs in the post-proof zone: arguments, limits, and business rules.
Rejects: A well-proved request asking for something it is not allowed to ask for.
Serve the request
The application does its work, and the response is bound back to the request that earned it.
How a Gate decides
Read the pipeline left-to-right: each Gate stage checks binding, freshness, and burn order before allow. Gold highlights burn-before-validate so replay dies at the ledger, not after crypto. Takeaway: enforcement order is part of the security claim, not a UX detail.
Replay dies at the ledger
Duplicate ceremony rejected at ledger via burn-before-validate
Burn-before-validate is the structural reason a second submission of the same envelope always fails.ShippingGate stage 5 spends the nonce in the durable ledger before stage 6 validates the proof.Holds under the reference architecture
Replay is impossible by design.ShippingThe nonce is burned before validation in a durable ledger; it is spent even when validation later fails.Holds under the reference architecture
The verifier observes allow or deny for that request alone - not a reusable authorizer. Formal model and axioms live on Technology · Axioms.
How attacks fail
Classical and modern attack families try to convert observation or theft into usable authority. One-shot proofs deny that conversion - family by family.
Burn-before-validate stops replay
How to read: second-submit myths fail; ledger burn then reject. Takeaway: spent nonces do not authorize again.
Replay
Burn-before-validate: spent nonces do not authorize a second submission.
See how we stop it →No reusable vault on channel
How to read: transferable-secret conversion myths fail; circuit identity and burn succeed. Takeaway: identity in circuits, not a secret store.
Vault breach
Stolen vault material is not a reusable authorizer on the channel.
See how we stop it →Nothing reusable to harvest
How to read: lasting-credential myths fail; one-shot proof fragment is request-bound. Takeaway: no lasting credential; binding holds.
Phishing
Stolen ceremony fragments do not replay as ambient credentials.
See how we stop it →Flat marginals deny counting
How to read: broken compass on the left; uniform bearings and empty MI on the right. Takeaway: P2 uniformity removes the letter compass.
Frequency analysis
Flat synonym marginals deny letter-counting compasses.
See how we stop it →Session independence holds
How to read: stitch myths fail left; fresh challenge and ambiguity hold right. Takeaway: transcripts do not become the secret.
Correlation
Session independence stops transcripts from stitching into secrets.
See how we stop it →Keylog captures spent work
How to read: password-reuse myths fail; bearings → burn → already spent. Takeaway: surface only; authority spent.
Keylogging
Captured input does not become lasting request authority.
See how we stop it →Authority dies with the request
How to read: ambient myths fail; per-request proof and burn succeed. Takeaway: no long-lived bearer on the channel.
Agents & MCP
Per-call tool authority without reusable ambient secrets.
See how we stop it →Info bounds ≠ computational hardness
How to read: wrong targets crossed out; empty channel, burn, scoped claims. Takeaway: quantum myths versus information bounds.
Quantum cryptanalysis
Quantum myths versus model-scoped information bounds.
See how we stop it →Mint. Revoke. Enforce. Prove.
Foundry mints identity. Control revokes with one registry state change. Gate enforces one-shot authority on the request path. Verify proves the reject stages before production traffic does.
Four authorization planes
Read top-to-bottom through Foundry (mint twins), Control (registry and ledger), Gate (request boundary), and Verify (adversary harness). Each band is a different ops job that ships the same proof family. Takeaway: the product stack separates integrity tooling from the empty-channel authorization thesis.
Full catalog and form factors on Products.
Technology · Math
The formal case, when you need it
Public transcripts can be recorded without teaching the secret under the named model. Open Math for axioms, bounds, and claim scope - this page stays on buyer outcomes.
When you need the formal case: under the named model, recording the public channel need not teach the secret. Download New Dimensions or open Math for axioms, bounds, and claim scope.
Download New Dimensions · Math hub · Read the Math
Two kinds of security
Two columns contrast a computational hardness assumption with empty-channel authorization. Takeaway: not every security claim is the same kind of guarantee.
This plate contrasts a computational public artifact whose inverse exists but is hard with a zero-information channel whose public scaffold displays every path while the private selector remains outside the observable boundary.
Read left-to-right: computational hardness assumptions bound the adversary; the zero-information panel relocates confidence to transcript emptiness. Takeaway: long-horizon security moves from recoverable-archive cost to the information content of the channel.
Math
Axioms, bounds, and claim-scoped formal posture - outbound from the homepage outcomes above.
Open Math hub →Why not all proofs are equal
Different proof classes answer different questions; do not treat them as interchangeable guarantees.
Explore →Axioms, theorems, and bounds
The reference stack: axioms → theorems → model-scoped bounds.
Explore →Technology · Fundamentals
Prove once without teaching the channel
Capture is not knowledge under the named model. Fundamentals walks the empty effective channel into Rosario, Overview, and the published corpus.
Prove knowledge once without teaching the channel what you know. Overview, Channel Zero, Rosario, and Papers collect the pedagogy and published corpus.
Fundamentals path · channel reveals nothing
A fundamentals path plate: when the channel reveals nothing, capture is not knowledge. Takeaway: Channel Zero sits beside familiar crypto primitives with a different job.
Overview
What Technology teaches, in what order, and how Math and Fundamentals connect.
Explore →When the channel reveals nothing
Record the public transcript; leave the secret untouched under the named model.
Explore →How Rosario works
One-shot knowledge proofs - mechanism, witnesses, and verifier outcome.
Explore →Research papers
Abstracts and audience tags over the published corpus, including New Dimensions.
Explore →Protect a high-risk route
Start with Gate on one high-risk route and observe allow or deny - including replay fail. Or request a Foundry evaluation for licensed cohort manufacturing and Control under Public, Cloud, or Sovereign packages.
Protect an endpoint
Minimal wrap-this-route diagram for protecting an endpoint
Need executive delivery alongside the product? Fractional CAISO lives under Services. Services
Put Gate on one high-risk route and observe allow or deny - including replay fail - or talk to us about Foundry and Control under Public, Cloud, or Sovereign packages.