Build · Path B
BYOI — publish, pin, prove
Bring-your-own identity: the user hosts a public verifier; your relying party pins the digest, issues a challenge, and accepts only a nonce-bound proof. Same pipeline as org twins — discovery is by URL instead of handle.
Path A (org handle) and Path B (authenticator URL) are mutually exclusive on dual-XOR faces: both or neither → reject. That prevents pairing a victim subject with an attacker-supplied authenticator URL.
Quickstart
1. Publish two files
Serve the exact public verifier bytes at a retrievable HTTPS URL and a sibling digest file in standard sha256sum format. Public verifiers only — secret-bearing provers stay private.
2. Pin the sidecar digest
The relying party resolves the expected digest from the sibling file (or authority binding), not from client-typed text. Cache bytes under a digest-keyed path.
3. Challenge → prove → burn
Issue a one-time nonce. The client returns a nonce-bound proof. Validate against the pinned digest and burn the nonce so replay fails under the reference architecture.
4. Optional short session
On success, mint the same session or cookie your APIs already understand. The session is convenience — not the root of identity.
Mechanism claims
Authority expires at the end of each request.ShippingThe envelope binds method, endpoint_id, request hash, policy hash, tau, and nonce (one message, one use).Holds under the reference architecture
Replay is impossible by design.ShippingThe nonce is burned before validation in a durable ledger; it is spent even when validation later fails.Holds under the reference architecture
Burn-before-validate is the structural reason a second submission of the same envelope always fails.ShippingGate stage 5 spends the nonce in the durable ledger before stage 6 validates the proof.Holds under the reference architecture