The problem as published
Orchestrators that spawn specialist agents often share one API key or service account across tools. A prompt-injected or compromised agent then inherits ambient authority to every downstream system for the life of the credential.
How ENI6MA would apply
ENI6MA would issue per-agent or per-role circuits, enforce Gate SDK middleware or MCP wrapper on each side-effecting tool, and bind envelopes to endpoint_id and request body hash so Agent A’s proof could not authorize Agent B’s tool call. Control would revoke a single agent handle without rotating the whole fleet.
Expected outcomes if implemented
- Would confine a compromised agent to the circuits it holds, not a shared org-wide secret.
- Would make cross-agent proof transplant fail endpoint and binding checks.
- Would give operators per-agent revocation without redeploying every tool server.
Reference architecture
Gate: SDK middleware + MCP wrapper · Circuit: hybrid (agent mode) · Control: registry per-agent handles
Absolute mechanism claims hold under the reference architecture.
