Machine-to-machine authorization

Workload-to-workload calls prove per-request authority with hybrid agent-mode circuits, not a shared API key in every pod.

Service meshes and mTLS tell you which workload spoke. They do not by themselves prove that this POST with this body may run once. Shared service account tokens collapse that distinction (steal one, call everything).

ENI6MA issues circuits per service identity, enforces Gate on the callee, and burns nonces before validation so captured traffic is not reusable authority. Revocation is handle deactivation in Control, not a secret rotation across every replica.

What this solution claims

Machine-to-machine calls can prove per-request authority without a shared long-lived service secret.ValidatedAgent-mode hybrid circuits mint envelopes bound to method, endpoint, and body hash.

Identity is compiled into the circuit binary (there is no vault of reusable secrets to steal).ShippingConfig, entropy, and policy travel with the artifact; the handle resolves to the active binary.Holds under the reference architecture

Revocation is one registry state change on the circuit handle, not a rotation campaign across every workload.ShippingDeactivating a handle stops new envelopes for that identity at the control plane.Holds under the reference architecture