The problem as published
Large financial institutions sign and authorize high volumes of digital transactions under strict non-repudiation and audit rules. Certificate hierarchies and digital signatures remain necessary for transport and document integrity, but the credentials that authorize API calls (bearer tokens, service certs reused as capabilities) are the layer that keeps getting breached.
How ENI6MA would apply
ENI6MA would leave PKI and mTLS in place for channel identity, then layer Gate reverse-proxy or sidecar enforcement so each mutating call carries an envelope bound to method, endpoint_id, body hash, policy hash, tau, and nonce. Hybrid circuits would give post-quantum key agreement on the prover side while Control records burn events for audit.
Expected outcomes if implemented
- Would strengthen protection of sensitive financial APIs with quantum-ready key agreement on hybrid circuits.
- Would produce per-call audit evidence (burn + allow/reject) that maps cleanly to regulatory review.
- Would reduce dependency on MFA devices and long-lived service tokens for machine-initiated transaction paths.
Reference architecture
Gate: reverse proxy · Circuit: hybrid · Control: registry + ledger + visibility · Coexistence: mTLS retained
Absolute mechanism claims hold under the reference architecture.
